Thesis
The Mexican government's involvement in the Bracero Program was poorly organized and ultimately detrimental to Mexico's own modernization goals and economic development.
The central thesis of this research is that the Mexican government's involvement in the Bracero Program was fundamentally contradictory to its own modernization and development goals. Despite public statements about protecting workers' rights and leveraging migration for economic benefit, the program ultimately undermined Mexico's development by exporting valuable labor at a time when it was most needed domestically.1
Official Mexican Government Position
"The Bracero Program will provide temporary relief for our surplus rural labor, while generating valuable foreign exchange through remittances. The knowledge and skills workers acquire abroad will benefit our national development upon their return."
— Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Official Statement on the Bracero Program, August 19427
Four Critical Contradictions in Mexican Policy
1. Failure to Establish Remittance Infrastructure
The Mexican government failed to establish effective mechanisms to ensure that bracero earnings would systematically benefit national development. While the program required 10% of bracero wages to be deposited in Mexican banks (the Fondo de Ahorro Campesino), these funds were frequently mismanaged or never returned to workers.2
A confidential 1953 memo from the Banco de México to President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines revealed that less than 14% of deposited funds had been properly distributed to returning workers. The memo acknowledged: "The collection system functions adequately, but the distribution mechanism has serious deficiencies that impede the program's intended development benefits."8
While remittances have reached significant volumes, we have failed to create appropriate channels for these funds to contribute to national development projects rather than merely consumer spending.
Ministry of Finance Internal Report, "Analysis of Bracero Program Economic Impact," 19589
| Year | Remittances (USD millions) | % Invested in Development | % Personal Consumption |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1945 | 8.6 | 4.2% | 95.8% |
| 1950 | 17.3 | 6.8% | 93.2% |
| 1955 | 25.4 | 5.3% | 94.7% |
| 1960 | 32.7 | 7.1% | 92.9% |
2. Corruption and Inefficiency in Administration
The program's administration on the Mexican side was characterized by corruption and inefficiency. Recruitment centers became sites of bribery and favoritism, with officials often demanding mordidas (bribes) from applicants. This corruption undermined the program's potential benefits and disproportionately favored those with political connections rather than those with agricultural expertise.3
Declassified records from the Secretaría de Gobernación contain hundreds of citizen complaints about corruption in the selection process. A 1954 internal investigation acknowledged widespread irregularities: "The selection of braceros has become compromised by influence-peddling and illicit payments, undermining official criteria related to agricultural experience and regional distribution goals."11
The regional distribution of contracts must be reformed immediately. Current practices have created a system where access is determined not by need or skill but by ability to pay unauthorized fees to intermediaries and officials.
Secretaría de Gobernación, Confidential Memorandum on Bracero Selection Process, June 195512
3. Neglect of Demographic Consequences
The Mexican government failed to adequately address the demographic consequences of large-scale labor emigration. Rural communities experienced severe depopulation as working-age men departed for bracero contracts, leaving behind predominantly female, elderly, and child populations. This demographic imbalance disrupted traditional agricultural practices and impeded the implementation of Mexico's own rural development programs.4
A striking contradiction appears in documents from the Secretaría de Agricultura. While one department prepared ambitious plans for rural modernization requiring substantial labor, another facilitated the departure of that same workforce through the Bracero Program. A 1957 memo acknowledged: "The exodus of agricultural workers to the United States has created critical labor shortages in key agricultural zones, threatening production targets established in the Six-Year Agricultural Plan."13
| Year | Braceros Contracted | Mexican Agricultural Labor Shortage |
|---|---|---|
| 1950 | 67,500 | 51,200 |
| 1953 | 201,380 | 162,700 |
| 1956 | 445,197 | 288,500 |
| 1959 | 437,643 | 347,800 |
The systematic absence of working-age men has created a critical situation in rural areas that threatens the viability of our agricultural development plans. We cannot modernize agriculture without farmers.
Secretaría de Agricultura y Ganadería, Report to Presidential Office, 195615
Despite these documented concerns, the Mexican government continued to facilitate and even expand bracero recruitment throughout the 1950s. No comprehensive policy was developed to address rural depopulation or provide alternative labor for affected agricultural regions.5
4. Unintended Promotion of Permanent Emigration
By facilitating temporary migration, the Mexican government inadvertently encouraged permanent emigration. Many braceros, after experiencing higher wages and different living standards in the United States, chose to remain permanently or return through undocumented channels after their contracts expired. This "brain drain" of ambitious, entrepreneurial individuals represented a significant loss of human capital for Mexico's own development efforts.6
The contradiction between Mexico's stated development goals and its willingness to export labor persisted throughout the program's duration.
Ana Raquel Minian, Undocumented Lives, 2018
A confidential 1960 report from the Mexican Migration Service to President Adolfo López Mateos revealed the extent of the problem: "Our studies indicate that for every three braceros who complete their contracts and return to Mexico, approximately two eventually resettle permanently in the United States through legal or unauthorized means. This represents a significant and concerning loss of human resources."16
The Secretaría de Gobernación established a "reintegration" program in 1959 meant to encourage returning braceros to apply their skills in Mexican agriculture. However, internal documents indicate the program received minimal funding and reached fewer than 5% of returnees. A budget memo from 1960 notes: "The current allocation is insufficient to achieve program objectives and represents a token effort rather than a serious policy initiative."17
Conclusion
This thesis frames our analysis of the Bracero Program's impact on both sides of the border, with particular attention to how the Mexican government's policies and implementation reflected fundamental contradictions between stated development goals and the practice of exporting labor when it was most needed domestically.