The El Centro Reception Center in California's Imperial Valley was one of the largest bracero processing facilities, handling over 500,000 workers between 1942 and 1964. Internal operations records from 1956-1957 provide insight into the administrative machinery of the program. During peak periods, the center processed up to 2,500 braceros daily through a multi-stage system including medical examinations, fumigation, document verification, and contract assignment.²

At El Centro, I felt like cattle being inspected at market. They made us strip naked for the medical exam with twenty men at a time. Then they sprayed us with DDT powder before we could dress again. It was humiliating, but we endured it for the opportunity to work.

Joaquín Ramírez, bracero processed at El Centro, 1958, Bracero History Archive oral history, 2004

Processing Procedure at El Centro

1. Initial Registration: Documentation verification and paperwork
2. Medical Examination: Group screening for disqualifying conditions
3. Fumigation: DDT powder application (now known to be toxic)
4. Skills Assessment: Brief interviews about agricultural experience
5. Contract Assignment: Matching to employer requests
6. Transportation Arrangement: Assignment to buses or trains

Medical records from El Centro reveal concerning patterns: approximately 12% of bracero applicants were rejected for medical reasons, with tuberculosis, venereal disease, and hernias being the most common disqualifying conditions. Those approved underwent fumigation with DDT and received minimal health education.³

Discriminatory Allocation Practices

The center's records document the sorting process by which braceros were assigned to employers, revealing preferences that belied the program's supposedly impartial allocation system. Employers could request workers from specific regions of Mexico, with workers from central Mexico (Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán) often preferred over those from border states due to perceptions about work ethic and likelihood of remaining for full contracts.⁴

Internal classification systems categorized workers using subjective criteria that often reflected racial and ethnic stereotypes. A 1957 El Centro operations manual instructed staff to code applicants as "Type A" (preferred), "Type B" (acceptable), or "Type C" (last resort) based on physical appearance, demeanor during interviews, and region of origin—rather than verified agricultural skills or experience.⁵

These processing centers were the first contact many braceros had with the program, setting the tone for their entire experience. The assembly-line approach to human processing both reflected and reinforced the program's view of Mexican workers as interchangeable units of labor rather than individuals with rights and dignity.

The Purépecha indigenous community of Cherán, Michoacán saw 38% of its working-age men participate in the Bracero Program between 1943 and 1964. This high participation rate produced dramatic demographic and economic shifts. Census data shows that the village's population declined from 5,275 in 1940 to 4,832 in 1960, despite high birth rates, as men who initially participated as braceros later brought their families north or remained permanently in the United States.⁶

Agricultural production in Cherán declined significantly: municipal records document a 42% reduction in cultivated land between 1945 and 1960. Much of this land was purchased by successful braceros but left underutilized or fallow due to labor shortages and absentee ownership.⁷

Remittance Effects

Remittances transformed the local economy in other ways. A 1958 survey found that 65% of new houses built in Cherán since 1950 were funded by bracero earnings. The local mercado (market) expanded from 24 vendors in 1945 to 68 by 1962, selling increasingly diverse goods, including many American products introduced by returning braceros.⁸

Cultural Changes

Cherán experienced profound cultural shifts. The traditional Purépecha language declined in usage, particularly among children, as Spanish became associated with economic opportunity and mobility. Traditional community governance structures (based on age and communal service) were challenged as younger braceros gained economic power and introduced new ideas about leadership and decision-making.⁹

Long-Term Legacy

By 1970, census data showed that Cherán had established permanent migration networks, with approximately 18% of all households having at least one member permanently residing in the United States. The village became increasingly dependent on remittances rather than developing local economic capacity. This case illustrates how the Bracero Program's impacts extended far beyond its official timeframe, creating persistent migration patterns that continue to shape communities today.¹⁰

On September 17, 1963, a converted flatbed truck carrying 56 braceros collided with a freight train at an unmarked railroad crossing near Chualar in California's Salinas Valley. The collision killed 32 braceros and injured 25 others, making it the deadliest accident in the program's history. Most victims were from the Mexican states of Jalisco and Zacatecas.¹¹

The subsequent investigation revealed numerous safety violations. The vehicle was a converted flatbed truck with wooden benches and no safety restraints, far exceeding its intended capacity. The driver had limited English proficiency and was unfamiliar with the route. The railroad crossing lacked warning signs, lights, or gates despite its location on a major farm worker transportation route.¹²

I still hear the screams in my dreams. We were packed in so tight that when the train hit, there was nowhere to go. Bodies everywhere. And afterward, the way they handled it—many families in Mexico never even learned what happened to their sons, brothers, fathers.

Jesús Garza, survivor of the Chualar accident, Interview, 1993

Institutional Failures

The tragedy exemplified systemic failures in bracero transportation oversight. Responsibility was divided among numerous agencies (Department of Labor, Immigration and Naturalization Service, California Highway Patrol, farm labor contractors), creating accountability gaps. The farm labor contractor responsible for the transportation had been cited three times previously for safety violations but continued to operate.¹³

Media coverage of the accident revealed disparities in how bracero deaths were treated. Initial reports in the Salinas Californian identified victims only as "Mexican nationals" without names. While the local community organized a memorial service, no U.S. government officials attended. Many victims were buried in unmarked mass graves in Mexico, with families receiving minimal compensation.¹⁴

Aftermath and Legacy

The accident occurred just months before the program's termination and became a powerful symbol of its failures. Congressional hearings on whether to extend the program in October 1963 referenced the tragedy repeatedly. Civil rights organizations used the incident in their "Blood on Your Salad" campaign, connecting consumer awareness of bracero working conditions with calls for program reform or termination.¹⁵

Despite the scale of the tragedy, systematic improvements to worker transportation safety were not implemented in the program's final months. This case illustrates how even the most dramatic failures resulted in minimal institutional response or accountability, highlighting the program's fundamental disregard for worker welfare.¹⁶